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Abstract
Methods to solve a node discovery problem for a social network are presented. Covert nodes refer to the
nodes which are not observable directly. They transmit the influence and affect the resulting collaborative
activities among the persons in a social network, but do not appear in the surveillance logs which record
the participants of the collaborative activities. Discovering the covert nodes is identifying the suspicious logs
where the covert nodes would appear if the covert nodes became overt. The performance of the methods is
demonstrated with a test dataset generated from computationally synthesized networks and a real organization.
∗Yoshiharu Maeno, Ph.D. is a founder management consultant of Social Design Group, Sengoku 1-6-38F, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo
112-0011 Japan. Telephone: +81-90-8009-1968. Email: maeno.yoshiharu@socialdesigngroup.com.
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1 Introduction
Covert nodes refer to persons who transmit the influence
and affect the resulting collaborative activities among
the persons in a social network, but do not appear in
the surveillance logs which record the participants of the
activities. The covert nodes are not observable directly.
It aids us in discovering and approaching to the covert
nodes to identify the suspicious surveillance logs where
the covert nodes would appear if they became overt. I
call this problem a node discovery problem for a social
network.
Where do we encounter such a problem? Globally
networked clandestine organizations such as terrorists,
criminals, or drug smugglers are great threat to the
civilized societies [Sageman (2004)]. Terrorism attacks
cause great economic, social and environmental dam-
age. Active non-routine responses to the attacks are
necessary as well as the damage recovery management.
The short-term target of the responses is the arrest of
the perpetrators. The long-term target of the responses
is identifying and dismantling the covert organizational
foundation which raises, encourages, and helps the per-
petrators. The threat will be mitigated and eliminated
by discovering covert leaders and critical conspirators
of the clandestine organizations. The difficulty of such
discovery lies in the limited capability of surveillance.
Information on the leaders and critical conspirators are
missing because it is usually hidden by the organization
intentionally.
Let me show an example in the 9/11 terrorist attack
in 2001 [Krebs (2002)]. Mustafa A. Al-Hisawi, whose al-
ternate name was Mustafa Al-Hawsawi, was alleged to
be a wire-puller who had acted as a financial manager of
Al Qaeda. He had attempted to help terrorists enter the
United States, and provided the hijackers of the 4 air-
crafts with financial support worth more than 300,000
dollars. Furthermore, Osama bin Laden is suspected to
be a wire-puller behind Mustafa A. Al-Hisawi and the
conspirators behind the hijackers. These persons were
not recognized as wire-pullers at the time of the attack.
They were the nodes to discover from the information
on the collaborative activities of the perpetrators and
conspirators known at that moment.
In this paper, I present two methods to solve the
node discovery problem. One is a heuristic method in
[Maeno (2009)], which demonstrates a simulation ex-
periment of the node discovery problem for the social
network of the 9/11 perpetrators. The other is a statis-
tical inference method which I propose in this paper.
The method employs the maximal likelihood estima-
tion and an anomaly detection technique. Section 3 de-
fines the node discovery problem mathematically. Sec-
tion 4 presents the two methods. Section 5 introduces
the test dataset generated from computationally syn-
thesized networks and a real clandestine organization.
Section 6 demonstrates the performance characteristics
of the methods (precision, recall, and van Rijsbergen’s
F measure [Korfhuge (1997)]). Section 7 presents the
issues and future perspectives as concluding remarks.
Section 2 summarizes the related works.
2 Related Work
The social network analysis is a study of social struc-
tures made of nodes which are linked by one or more
specific types of relationship. Examples of the rela-
tionship are influence transmission in communication or
presence of trust in collaboration [Lavrac˘ (2007)]. Net-
work topological characteristics of clandestine terrorist
organizations [Krebs (2002)] and criminal organizations
[Klerks (2002)] are studied. Trade-off between staying
secret and efficiently securing coordination and control
is of particular interest [Morselli (2007)]. The impact
of the network topology to the trade-off is analyzed
[Lindelauf (2009)].
Research interests have been moving from describ-
ing organizational structure to discovering dynamical
phenomena on a social network. A link discovery pre-
dicts the existence of an unknown link between two
nodes from the information on the known attributes of
the nodes and the known links [Clauset (2008)]. It is
one of the tasks of link mining [Getoor (2005)]. The
link discovery techniques are combined with domain-
specific heuristics. The collaboration between scien-
tists can be predicted from the published co-authorship
[Liben-Nowell (2004)]. The friendship between people
is inferred from the information available on their web
pages [Adamic (2003)].
Markov random network is a model of the joint prob-
ability distribution of random variables. It is an undi-
rected graphical model similar to a Bayesian network.
The Markov random network is used to learn the de-
pendency between the links which shares a node. The
Markov random network is one of the dependence graphs
[Frank (1986)], which models the dependency between
links. Extension to hierarchical models [Lazega (1999)],
multiple networks (treating different types of relation-
ships) [Pattison (1999)], valued networks (with nodal
attributes) [Robins (1999)], higher order dependency be-
tween the links which share no nodes [Pattison (2002)],
and 2-block chain graphs (associating one set of ex-
planatory variables with the other set of outcome vari-
ables) [Robins (2001)] are studied. A family of such
extensions and model elaborations is named the expo-
nential random graph [Anderson (1999)].
In addition to the link discovery, the related re-
search topics are the exploration of an unknown network
structure [Newman (2007)], the discovery of a commu-
nity structure [Palla (2005)], the inference of a network
topology [Rabbat (2008)], the detection of an anomaly
in a network [Silva (2009)], and the discovery of un-
known nodes [Maeno (2007)], [Maeno (2009)]. Stochas-
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tic modeling to predict terrorism attacks [Singh (2004)]
is relevant practically. The idea of machine learning of
latent variables [Silva (2006)] is potentially applicable
to discovering an unknown network structure.
3 Problem definition
The node discovery problem is defined mathematically
in this section. A node represents a person in a so-
cial network. A link represents a relationship which
transmits the influence between persons. The symbols
nj (j = 0, 1, · · ·) represent the nodes. Some nodes are
overt (observable), but the others are covert (unobserv-
able). O denotes the overt nodes; {n0, n1, · · · , nN−1}.
Its cardinality is |O| = N . C = O denotes the covert
nodes; {nN , nN+1, · · · , nM−1}. Its cardinality is |C| =
M −N . The whole nodes in a social network is O ∪C.
The number of the nodes is M . The unobservability of
the covert nodes arises either from a technical defect of
surveillance means or an intentional cover-up operation.
The symbol δi represent a set of participants in a
particular collaborative activity. It is the i-th activity
pattern among the nodes. A pattern δi is a set of nodes;
δi is a subset of O ∪ C. For example, the nodes in
an collaborative activity pattern are those who joined
a particular conference call. That is, a pattern is a
co-occurrence among the nodes [Rabbat (2008)]. The
unobservability of the covert nodes does not affect the
activity patterns themselves.
A simple hub-and-spokemodel is assumed as a model
of the influence transmission over the links resulting the
collaborative activities among the nodes. The way how
the influence is transmitted governs the set of possi-
ble activity patterns {δi}. The network topology and
the influence transmission are described by some prob-
ability parameters. The probability where the influ-
ence transmits from an initiating node nj to a respon-
der node nk is rjk. The influence transmits to multiple
responders independently in parallel. It is similar to
the degree of collaboration probability in trust model-
ing [Lavrac˘ (2007)]. The constraints are 0 ≤ rjk and∑
k 6=j rjk ≤ 1. The quantity fj is the probability where
the node nj becomes an initiator. The constraints are
0 ≤ fj and
∑N−1
j=0 fj = 1. These parameters are defined
for the whole nodes in a social network (both the nodes
in O and C).
A surveillance log di records a set of the overt nodes
in a collaborative activity pattern; δi. It is given by
eq.(1). A log di is a subset of O. The number of data
is D. A set {di} is the whole surveillance logs dataset.
di = δi ∩O (0 ≤ i < D). (1)
Note that neither an individual node nor a single
link alone can be observed directly, but nodes can be
observed collectively as a collaborative activity pattern.
The dataset {di} can be expressed by a 2-dimensional
D × N matrix of binary variables d. The presence or
absence of the node nj in the data di is indicated by the
elements in eq.(2).
dij =
{
1 if nj ∈ di
0 otherwise
(0 ≤ i < D, 0 ≤ j < N). (2)
Solving the node discovery problem means identify-
ing all the surveillance logs where covert nodes would
appear if they became overt. In other words, it means
to identifying the logs for which di 6= δi holds because
of the covert nodes belonging to C.
4 Solution
4.1 Heuristic method
A heuristic method to solve the node discovery problem
is studied in [Maeno (2009)]. The method is reviewed
briefly.
At first, every node which appears in the dataset
{di} is classified into one of the clusters cl (0 ≤ l < C).
The number of clusters is C, which depends on the prior
knowledge. Mutually close nodes form a cluster. The
measure of closeness between a pair of nodes is evaluated
by the Jaccard’s coefficient [Liben-Nowell (2004)]. It is
used widely in link discovery, web mining, or text pro-
cessing. The Jaccard’s coefficient between the nodes n
and n′ is defined by eq.(3). The function B(s) in eq.(3)
is a Boolean function which returns 1 if the proposition
s is trueCor 0 otherwise. The operators ∧ and ∨ are
logical AND and OR.
J(n, n′) =
∑D−1
i=0 B(n ∈ di ∧ n
′ ∈ di)∑D−1
i=0 B(n ∈ di ∨ n
′ ∈ di)
. (3)
The k-medoids clustering algorithm [Hastie (2001)]
is employed for classification of the nodes. It is an EM
(expectation-maximization) algorithm similar to the k-
means algorithm for numerical data. A medoid node
locates most centrally within a cluster. It corresponds
to the center of gravity in the k-means algorithm. The
clusters and the modoid nodes are re-calculated itera-
tively until they converge into a stable structure. The
k-medoids clustering algorithm may be substituted by
other clustering algorithms such as hierarchical cluster-
ing or self-organizing mapping.
Then, suspiciousness of every surveillance log di as a
candidate where the covert nodes would appear is eval-
uated with a ranking function s(di). The ranking func-
tion returns higher value for a more suspicious log. The
strength of the correlation between the log di and the
cluster cl is defined by w(di, cl) in eq.(4) as a prepara-
tion.
w(di, cl) = max
nj∈cl
B(nj ∈ di)∑D−1
i=0 B(nj ∈ di)
. (4)
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The ranking function takes w(di, cl) as an input.
Various forms of ranking functions can be constructed.
For example, [Maeno (2009)] studied a simple form in
eq.(5) where the function u(x) returns 1 if the real vari-
able x is positive, or 0 otherwise.
s(di) ∝
C−1∑
l=0
u(w(di, cl))
=
C−1∑
l=0
B(di ∩ cl 6= φ). (5)
The i-th most suspicious log is given by dσ(i) where
σ(i) is calculated by eq.(6). Suspiciousness s(dσ(i)) is
always larger than s(dσ(i′)) for any i < i
′.
σ(i) = arg max
m 6=σ(n) for ∀n<i
s(dm) (1 ≤ i ≤ D). (6)
The computational burden of the method remains
light as the number of nodes and surveillance logs in-
creases. The method is expected to work generally for
clustered networks but moderately even if the network
topological and stochastic mechanism to generate the
surveillance logs is not understood well. The method
works without the knowledge about the hub-and-spoke
model; the parametric form with rjk and fj in Section 3.
The result, however, can not be very accurate because
of the heuristic nature. A statistical inference method
which requires heavy computational burden, but out-
puts more accurate results is presented next.
4.2 Statistical inference method
The statistical inference method employs the maximal
likelihood estimation to infer the topology of the net-
work, and applies an anomaly detection technique to
retrieve the suspicious surveillance logs which are not
likely to realize without the covert nodes. The maximal
likelihood estimation is a basic statistical method used
for fitting a statistical model to data and for providing
estimates for the model’s parameters. The anomaly de-
tection refers to detecting patterns in a given dataset
that do not conform to an established normal behavior.
A single symbol θ represent both of the parame-
ters rjk and fj for the nodes in O. θ is the target
variable, the value of which needs to be inferred from
the surveillance log dataset. The logarithmic likelihood
function [Hastie (2001)] is defined by eq.(7). The quan-
tity p({di}|θ) denote the probability where the surveil-
lance log dataset {di} realizes under a given θ.
L(θ) = log(p({di}|θ)). (7)
The individual surveillance logs are assumed to be
independent. eq.(7) becomes eq.(8).
L(θ) = log(
D−1∏
i=0
p(di|θ))
=
D−1∑
i=0
log(p(di|θ)). (8)
The quantity qi|jk in eq.(9) is the probability where
the presence or absence of the node nk as a responder to
the stimulating node nj coincides with the surveillance
log di.
qi|jk =
{
rjk if dik = 1 for given i and j
1− rjk otherwise
. (9)
Eq.(9) is equivalent to eq.(10) since the value of dik
is either 0 or 1.
qi|jk = dikrjk + (1− dik)(1− rjk). (10)
The probability p({di}|θ) in eq.(8) is expressed by
eq.(11).
p(di|θ) =
N−1∑
j=0
dijfj
∏
0≤k<N ∧ k 6=j
qi|jk. (11)
The logarithmic likelihood function takes an explicit
formula in eq.(12). The case k = j in multiplication
(
∏
k) is included since d
2
ik = dik always holds.
L(θ) =
D−1∑
i=0
log(
N−1∑
j=0
dijfj
N−1∏
k=0
{1− dik
+(2dik − 1)rjk}). (12)
The maximal likelihood estimator θˆ is obtained by
solving eq.(13). It gives the values of the parameters
rjk and fj . A pair of nodes nj and nk for which rjk > 0
possesses a link between them.
θˆ = argmax
θ
L(θ). (13)
A simple incremental optimization technique; the
hill climbing method (or the method of steepest descent)
is employed to solve eq.(13). Non-deterministic meth-
ods such as simulated annealing [Hastie (2001)] can be
employed to strengthen the search ability and to avoid
sub-optimal solutions. These methods search more op-
timal parameter values around the present values and
update them as in eq.(14) until the values converge.
{
rjk → rjk +∆rjk
fj → fj +∆fj
(0 ≤ j, k < N). (14)
The change in the logarithmic likelihood function
can be calculated as a product of the derivatives (dif-
ferential coefficients with regard to r and f) and the
amount of the updates in eq.(15). The update ∆rnm
and ∆fn should be in the direction of the steepest ascent
in the landscape of the logarithmic likelihood function.
∆L(θ) =
N−1∑
n,m=0
∂L(θ)
∂rnm
∆rnm +
N−1∑
n=0
∂L(θ)
∂fn
∆fn. (15)
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The derivatives with regard to r are given by eq.(16).
∂L(θ)
∂rnm
=
D−1∑
i=0
[fndin(2dim − 1)
×
∏
k 6=m
{1− dik + (2dik − 1)rnk}
÷
N−1∑
j=0
dijfj
N−1∏
k=0
{1− dik + (2dik − 1)rjk}].
(16)
The derivatives with regard to f are given by eq.(17).
∂L(θ)
∂fn
=
D−1∑
i=0
[din
N−1∏
k=0
{1− dik + (2dik − 1)rnk}
÷
N−1∑
j=0
dijfj
N−1∏
k=0
{1− dik + (2dik − 1)rjk}].
(17)
The ranking function s(di) is the inverse of the prob-
ability at which di realizes under the maximal likelihood
estimator θˆ. According to the anomaly detection tech-
nique, it gives a higher return value to the suspicious
surveillance logs which are less likely to realize with-
out the covert nodes. The ranking function is given by
eq.(18).
s(di) =
1
p(di|θˆ)
. (18)
The i-th most suspicious log is given by dσ(i) by the
same formula in eq.(6).
5 Test Dataset
5.1 Network
Two classes of networks are employed to generate a test
dataset for performance evaluation of the two methods.
The first class is computationally synthesized networks.
The second class is a real clandestine organization.
The networks [A] in Figure 1 and [B] in Figure 2 are
synthesized computationally. They are based on the
Baraba´si-Albert model [Baraba´si (1999)] with a clus-
ter structure. The Baraba´si-Albert model grows with
preferential attachment. The probability where a newly
coming node nk connects a link to an existing node nj
is proportional to the nodal degree of nj (p(k → j) ∝
K(nj)). The occurrence frequency of the nodal degree
tends to be scale-free (F (K) ∝ Ka). In the Baraba´si-
Albert model with a cluster structure, every node nj
is assigned a pre-determined cluster attribute c(nj) to
which it belongs. The number of clusters is C. The
probability p(k → j) is modified to eq.(19). cluster
contrast parameter η is introduced. Links between the
Figure 1: Computationally synthesized network [A]
which consists of 101 nodes and 5 clusters. Cluster con-
trast parameter is η = 50. The network is relatively
more clustered. The node n12 is a typical hub node.
The node n75 is a typical peripheral node.
Figure 2: Computationally synthesized network [B]
which consists of 101 nodes and 5 clusters. Cluster con-
trast parameter is η = 2.5. The network is relatively
less clustered. The node n12 is a typical hub node. The
node n48 is a typical peripheral node.
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clusters appear less frequently as η increases. The ini-
tial links between the clusters are connected at random
before growth by preferential attachment starts.
p(k → j) ∝
{
η(C − 1)K(nj) if c(nj) = c(nk)
K(nj) otherwise
.
(19)
Hub nodes are those which have a nodal degree larger
than the average. The node n12 in the network [A] in
Figure 1 is a typical hub node. Peripheral nodes are
those which have a nodal degree smaller than the aver-
age. The node n75 in the network [A] in Figure 1 is a
typical peripheral node.
The network in Figure 3 represents a real clandes-
tine organization. It is a global mujahedin organization
which was analyzed in [Sageman (2004)]. The muja-
hedin in the global Salafi jihad means Muslim fighters
in Salafism (Sunni Islamic school of thought) who strug-
gle to establish justice on earth. Note that jihad does
not necessarily refer to military exertion. The organiza-
tion consists of 107 persons and 4 regional sub-networks.
The sub-networks represent Central Staffs (nCSj) in-
cluding the node nObL, Core Arabs (nCAj) from the
Arabian Peninsula countries and Egypt, Maghreb Arabs
(nMAj) from the North African countries, and Southeast
Asians (nSAj). The network topology is not simply hi-
erarchical. The 4 regional sub-networks are connected
mutually in a complex manner.
The node representing Osama bin Laden; nObL is a
hub (K(nObL) = 8). He is believed to be the founder
of the organization, and said to be the covert leader
who provides operational commanders in regional sub-
networks with financial support in many terrorism at-
tacks including 9/11 in 2001. His whereabouts are not
known despite many efforts in investigation and cap-
ture.
The topological characteristics of the above men-
tioned networks are summarized in Table 1. The global
mujahedin organization has a relatively large Gini co-
efficient of the nodal degree; G = 0.35 and a rela-
tively large average clustering coefficient [Watts (1998)];
〈W (nj)〉 = 0.54. In economics, the Gini coefficient is a
measure of inequality of income distribution or of wealth
distribution. A larger Gini coefficient indicates lower
equality. The values mean that the organization pos-
sesses hubs and a cluster structure. The values also
indicate that the computationally synthesized network
[A] is more clustered and close to the global mujahedin
organization while the network [B] is less clustered.
5.2 Test Dataset
The test dataset {di} is generated from each network in
5.1 in the 2 steps below.
In the first step, the collaborative activity patterns
{δi} are generated D times according to the influence
Figure 3: Social network representing a global muja-
hedin (Jihad fighters) organization [Sageman (2004)],
which consists of 107 nodes and 4 regional sub-networks.
The sub-networks represent Central Staffs (nCSj) in-
cluding the node nObL, Core Arabs (nCAj), Maghreb
Arabs (nMAj), and Southeast Asians (nSAj). The node
nObL is Osama bin Laden who many believe is the
founder of the organization.
Table 1: The number of nodesM , the number of clusters
C, the average degree 〈K(nj)〉, the average clustering
coefficient 〈W (nj)〉, and the Gini coefficient G of the
computationally synthesized networks (CSN) [A] and
[B], and the global mujahedin organization (GMO).
Model M C η 〈K〉 〈W 〉 G
CSN [A] 101 5 50 3.6 0.42 0.36
CSN [B] 101 5 2.5 3.9 0.22 0.37
GMO 107 - - 5.1 0.54 0.35
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transmission under the true value of θ. A pattern in-
cludes both an initiator node nj and multiple respon-
der nodes nk. An example is δex1 ={nCS1, nCS2, nCS6,
nCS7, nCS9, nObL, nCS11, nCS12, nCS14} for the global
mujahedin organization in Figure 3.
In the second step, the surveillance log dataset {di}
is generated by deleting the covert nodes belonging to C
from the patterns {δi}. The example δex1 results in the
surveillance log dex1 = δex1 ∩ C = {nCS1, nCS2, nCS6,
nCS7, nCS9, nCS11, nCS12, nCS14} if Osama bin Laden
is a cover node; C = nObL. The covert node in C
may appear multiple times in the collaborative activity
patterns {δi}. The number of the target logs to identify
Dt is given by eq.(20).
Dt =
D−1∑
i=0
B(di 6= δi). (20)
In the performance evaluation in Section 6, a few
assumptions are made for simplicity. The probability
fj does not depend on the nodes (fj = 1/M). The
value of the probability rjk is either 1 when a link is
present between nodes, or 1 otherwise. It means that
the number of the possible collaborative activity pat-
terns is bounded. The influence transmission is sym-
metrically bi-directional; rjk = rkj .
6 Performance
6.1 Performance measure
Three measures, precision, recall, and van Rijsbergen’s
F measure [Korfhuge (1997)], are used to evaluate the
performance of the methods. They are commonly used
in information retrieval such as search, document clas-
sification, and query classification. The precision p is
used as evaluation criteria, which is the fraction of the
number of relevant data to the number of the all data
retrieved by search. The recall r is the fraction of the
number of the data retrieved by search to the num-
ber of the all relevant data. The relevant data refers
to the data where di 6= δi. They are given by eq.(21)
and eq.(22) They are functions of the number of the re-
trieved data Dr. It can take the value from 1 to D. The
data is retrieved in the order of dσ(1), dσ(2), to dσ(Dr).
p(Dr) =
∑Dr
i=1 B(dσ(i) 6= δσ(i))
Dr
. (21)
r(Dr) =
∑Dr
i=1 B(dσ(i) 6= δσ(i))
Dt
. (22)
The F measure F is the harmonic mean of the pre-
cision and recall. It is given by eq.(23).
F (Dr) =
1
1
2 (
1
p(Dr)
+ 1
r(Dr)
)
=
2p(Dr)r(Dr)
p(Dr) + r(Dr)
. (23)
The precision, recall, and F measure range from 0
to 1. All the measures take larger values as the perfor-
mance of retrieval becomes better.
6.2 Comparison
The performance of the heuristic method and statistical
inference method is compared with the test dataset gen-
erated from the computationally synthesized networks.
Figure 4 shows the precision p(Dr) as a function of
the rate of the retrieved data to the whole data Dr/D
in case the hub node n12 in the computationally syn-
thesized network [A] in Figure 1 is the target covert
node to discover, C = {n12}. The three graphs are
for [a] the statistical inference method, [b] the heuristic
method (C = 5), and [c] the heuristic method (C = 10).
The number of the surveillance logs in a test dataset is
D = 100. The broken lines indicate the theoretical limit
(the upper bound) and the random retrieval (the lower
bound). The vertical solid line indicates the position
where Dr = Dt. Figure 5 shows the recall r(Dr) as a
function of the rate Dr/D. Figure 6 shows the F mea-
sure F (Dr) as a function of the rate Dr/D. The exper-
imental conditions are the same as those for Figure 4.
The performance of the heuristic method is moderately
good if the number of clusters is known as prior knowl-
edge. Otherwise, the performance would be worse. On
the other hand, the statistical inference method sur-
passes the heuristic method and approaches to the the-
oretical limit.
Figure 7 shows the F measure F (Dr) as a function of
the rate Dr/D in case the hub node n12 in the network
[B] in Figure 2 is the target covert node to discover. The
two graphs are for [a] the statistical inference method
and [b] the heuristic method (C = 5). The performance
of the statistical inference method is still good while
that of the heuristic method becomes worse in a less
clustered network.
Figure 8 shows the F measure F (Dr) as a function
of the rate Dr/D in case the peripheral node n75 in
the network [A] in Figure 1 is the target covert node
to discover. Figure 9 shows the F measure F (Dr) as a
function of the rate Dr/D when the peripheral node n48
in the network [B] in Figure 2 is the target covert node
to discover. The statistical inference method works fine
while the heuristic method fails.
6.3 Application
I illustrate how the method aids the investigators in
achieving the long-term target of the non-routine re-
sponses to the terrorism attacks. Let’s assume that the
investigators have surveillance logs of the members of
the global mujahedin organization except Osama bin
Laden by the time of the attack. Osama bin Laden
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Figure 4: Precision p(Dr) as a function of the rate of the
retrieved data to the whole data Dr/D in case the hub
node n12 in the computationally synthesized network
[A] in Figure 1 is the target covert node to discover.
C = {n12}. |C| = 1. |O| = 100. D = 100. The
three graphs are for [a] the statistical inference method,
[b] the heuristic method (C = 5), and [c] the heuristic
method (C = 10). The broken lines indicate the theo-
retical limit (the upper bound) and the random retrieval
(the lower bound). The vertical solid line indicates the
position where Dr = Dt.
Figure 5: Recall r(Dr) as a function of the rate Dr/D.
The experimental conditions are the same as those for
Figure 4.
Figure 6: F measure F (Dr) as a function of the rate
Dr/D. The experimental conditions are the same as
those for Figure 4.
Figure 7: F measure F (Dr) as a function of the rate
Dr/D in case the hub node n12 in the computationally
synthesized network [B] in Figure 2 is the target covert
node to discover. Two graphs are for [a] the statistical
inference method, and [b] the heuristic method (C = 5).
Figure 8: F measure F (Dr) as a function of the rate
Dr/D in case the peripheral node n75 in the computa-
tionally synthesized network [A] in Figure 1 is the target
covert node to discover. Two graphs are for [a] the sta-
tistical inference method, and [b] the heuristic method
(C = 5).
Figure 9: F measure F (Dr) as a function of the rate
Dr/D when the peripheral node n48 in the computa-
tionally synthesized network [B] in Figure 2 is the target
covert node to discover. Two graphs are for [a] the sta-
tistical inference method, and [b] the heuristic method
(C = 5).
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Figure 10: F measure F (Dr) as a function of the rate
of the retrieved data to the whole data Dr/D when the
statistical inference method is applied in case the node
nObL in Figure 3 is the target covert node to discover.
C = {nObL}. |C| = 1. |O| = 106. The graph is
for the statistical inference method. The broken lines
indicate the theoretical limit and the random retrieval.
The vertical solid line indicates the position where Dr =
Dt.
does not appear in the logs. This is the assumption
that the investigators neither know the presence of a
wire-puller behind the attack nor recognize Osama bin
Laden at the time of the attack.
The situation is simulated computationally like the
problems addressed in 6.2. In this case, the node nObL
in Figure 3 is the target covert node to discover, C =
{nObL}. Figure 10 shows F (Dr) as a function of the
rate of the retrieved data to the whole data Dr/D when
the statistical inference method is applied. The result
is close to the theoretical limit. The most suspicious
surveillance log dσ(1) includes all and only the neighbor
nodes nCS1, nCS2, nCS6, nCS7, nCS9, nCS11, nCS12, and
nCS14. This encourages the investigators to take an ac-
tion to investigate an unknown wire-puller near these
8 neighbors; the most suspicious close associates. The
investigators will decide to collect more detailed infor-
mation on the suspicious neighbors. It may result in
approaching to and finally capturing the covert wire-
puller responsible for the attack.
The method, however, fails to identify two suspicious
records δfl1={nObL, nCS11} and δfl2 = {nObL, nCS12}.
These nodes have a small nodal degree; K(nCS11) = 1
andK(nCS12) = 1. This shows that the surveillance logs
on the nodes having small nodal degree do not provide
the investigators with much clues for the covert nodes.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I define the node discovery problem for a
social network and present methods to solve the prob-
lem. The statistical inference method employs the max-
imal likelihood estimation to infer the topology of the
network, and applies an anomaly detection technique to
retrieve the suspicious surveillance logs which are not
likely to realize without the covert nodes. The pre-
cision, recall, and F measure characteristics are close
to the theoretical limit for the discovery of the covert
nodes in computationally synthesized networks and a
real clandestine organization. In the investigation of a
clandestine organization, the method aids the investiga-
tors in identifying the close associates and approaching
to a covert leader or a critical conspirator.
The node discovery problem is encountered in many
areas of business and social sciences. For example, in
addition to the analysis of a clandestine organization,
the method contributes to detecting an individual em-
ployee who transmits the influence to colleagues, but
whose catalytic role is not recognized by company man-
agers, may be critical in reorganizing a company struc-
ture.
I plan to address two issues for the future works. The
first issue is to extend the hub-and-spoke model for the
influence transmission. The model represents the ra-
dial transmission from an initiating node toward multi-
ple responder nodes. Other types of influence transmis-
sion are present in many real social networks. Examples
are serial chain-shaped influence transmission model or
tree-like influence transmission model. The second issue
is to develop a method to solve the variants of the node
discovery problem. Discovering fake nodes, or spoofing
nodes are also interesting problems to uncover the ma-
licious intentions of the organization. A fake node is
the person who does not exist in the organization, but
appears in the surveillance. A spoofing node is the per-
son who belongs to an organization, but appears as a
different node in the surveillance logs.
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